Greece: The struggle against the Right at a critical juncture

This year’s May Day (Labor Day) in Greece was a display of the challenges and the threats that the working class in Greece is facing. Here, Antonis Davanellos, a leader of the Internationalist Workers’ Left (DEA), assesses the current balance of class forces and the prospects for renewed struggle. Translated by Panos Petrou.

The first of May coincided with Greek-Orthodox Easter. This fact, combined with the obstacles of the quarantine and the fear of the Covid-19 that is still raging in the country, made a massive turnout harder.

The General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE), the main union confederation in the private sector, is dominated by an alliance of social-liberals (the most right-wing sector of the remnants of social-democratic PASOK) and unionists of the right-wing party. The Confederation has aligned itself with governmental policies and the Memoranda of austerity, which led to a total collapse of its credibility and membership. As the Communist Party notes in the documents it published in advance of its Congress, the levels of union density in the private sector has collapsed to historical low records. This year, GSEE called for a virtual-reality Labor Day “strike”, on the 4^th of May (during the Easter holiday vacations), during which it didn’t even dare to organize an open rally.

Facing this degeneration of GSEE, the situation is better in the main union organization of the public sector workers (ADEDY). The levels of union density in the Public Sector (which includes the crucial sectors of Healthcare and Education) remain quite high and this has forced ADEDY to adopt a more militant and independent position towards the governmental policies.

ADEDY, along with some local unions of the private sector that have differentiated themselves from GSEE (including the strong Workers’ Center of Athens) decided to honor Labor Day by declaring an actual strike on 6^th of May and calling for rallies in Athens, Thessaloniki and some big cities of Greece.

The main bulk of the mobilization was actually the people of the Left: The Communist Party members, the forces of the radical and anticapitalist Left and (for the first time in a long time) a part of SYRIZA.

For those who can still see beyond the problems of the pandemic and the existing objective difficulties to massive mobilization, the numbers that turned out in protest were bigger than expected. It was a display of forces capable of supporting and organizing a wider resistance.

This turnout is the result of a growing awareness of the dangers that our class is facing in the coming period.

The government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis–leader of the ultra-neoliberal current which today is dominant in New Democracy, the traditional party of the Right–is preparing a big counter-reform in labor relations, which threatens to sweep conquests that were won by the great workers struggles during “Metapolitefsi”, meaning the militant years after the fall of the military dictatorship (1974).

The bill that is being drafted by Chatzidakis (the Labor Minister of the right-wing party) abolishes the 8-hour working day while allowing employers to refuse extra pay for extra hours. It institutionalizes “individual contracts” between the worker and the boss, essentially cancelling the effect of collective agreements.It makes it harder to declare a strike in all workplaces and especially in the Public Sector (hospitals, schools, transport etc), where it institutes the “social responsibility” clause—which translates into an obligatory strikebreaking by 40% of the workforce. It also enables mass layoffs, by saving employers from any kind of obligation and responsibility.

It is a major threat in the field of labor relations, meaning the existing realities that the working class will face in its everyday life and struggle.

Many aspects of these reactionary changes, at some level have already been promoted in practice. This was the result of the 3 Memorandums –the vicious agreements signed by the Greek capitalists, the EU and the IMF–during the past crisis. And unfortunately, this includes the deeds of the SYRIZA government. When Alexis Tsipras surrendered governmental power to Mitsotakis in 2019, the actual medium wage of a worker had been reduced by 30% in comparison to 2009, precarious labor was rampant (in 2016 and 2017, under the SYRIZA government, “temporary” jobs became for the first time a majority of the new jobs found during that period), while unemployment was on the rise again. Today, official unemployment is around 19%, while unions estimate that actual unemployment is over 25% and is even higher among the youth.

Mitsotakis is building on these precedents. He is taking advantage of the pandemic as an opportunity; he is utilizing the responsibilities of Tsipras to discredit all notions of left-wing and working-class resistance, in order to impose a generalized reactionary turn—an unfavorable overhaul of the balance of forces between capital and the working class in Greece. But he is facing not only the mobilizations that the people of the Left can build (as proven in the past), but also the important problems and threats faced by the ruling class.

Contradictions and threats

It seems like a wind of optimism is blowing in the world of capital. “Now is the time!” is the slogan that dominates mainstream publications.

This not-so-well-founded optimism is based on the assumption that there is an imminent “take-off” of the economy and in anticipation of the European funds of financial support. As one can see in the press, the leading parts of the ruling class are engaged in an orgy of “investment projects” to seize the opportunities.

But reality is far more complex than that. The European funds disbursed during 2021 will amount to 4 billion Euros. This amount, which will be directed solely to the support of dynamic big enterprises (energy, telecommunication, digitalization, major construction, etc) is important. But it must be seen in comparison with some other figures: For example, in tourism–which, along with shipping, is the “locomotive” of the Greek economy–the most optimist scenario foresees this year’s income being around 40% of the income in 2019. And this will be the case as long as the pandemic is put under control before early summer, something epidemiologists consider unlikely…

As for the chances for a “takeoff” of economic growth, we should remember that according to previous forecasts, this phenomenon should already be underway today–and not just proclaimed. Instead, all data look bleaker.

The recession of 2020 was proven deeper than predicted (over 10%), while the Bank of Greece lowers its estimates for the growth during 2021 to 3.1%, in contrast to the 4.6% that was forecast in the governmental annual budget.

In the public debates around the economy, established analysts tend to hide the question of the debt under the carpet. Today, after 10 years of extreme austerity for its repayment, the public debt has risen to 341 billion Euros, or 205% of the GDP! Added to this stands the—by no means insignificant—private debt: It is over 242 billion Euros overall, but it is mostly businesses (and households to a lesser decree) that owe taxes and contributions for social security funds that amount to 145 billion Euros. Greece remains an over-indebted country.

Evagelos Venizelos, one of the most politically sophisticated representatives of the ruling class, a former leader of PASOK who co ruled with the far-right former leader of New Democracy Antonis Samaras during the second Memorandum, summarized the tasks ahead as follows: “We must prepare for the new inequalities inside the EU, for a new negotiation of the fiscal framework and mostly for the post-pandemic restructuring of Greek economy, with businesses closed and jobs lost.”

This cynical realism is closer to reality than the mood of carefree optimism broadcast by Mitsotakis and the mainstream media.

Financial prospects and the explosive social inequalities that will come to the surface after the quarantine will be crucial factors for the developments ahead, but it will not be the only factors.

Geopolitical confrontation with Turkey has been a central feature during the past years.

In this context, the Mitsotakis government (which in theory swears in a strategy of “small government”) has moved forward with an ambitious and costly program of armaments (buying American and French weapons), an important enhancement of militarism in many fields of social and political life, and an even more important boostto the country’s “strategic alliance” with the USA.

The reinforcement of the military potential of the Greek state and the aggressive diplomacy that aimed to transform the crisis in American-Turkish and European-Turkish relations into a “Greek advantage,” were connected with the notorious hydrocarbon strategy. This was the hope that a potential extraction of natural gas from the depths of the Eastern Mediterranean and a major multinational investment for the creation of the “East Med” pipeline, would transform Greece into an “energy hub” connecting the East with the EU—a modern-day “El Dorado” for Greek capitalism.

Meanwhile, this extractivist strategy has been put into question. Major multinationals “withdraw” from the rights to research-extract-sell, that they previously claimed and got (like the French Total and Italian Eni in the sea and land “fields” of western Greece). The governments of Israel, Egypt and Greece “leak” almost officially to the Press that they are in search of other, less costly and more realistic alternatives to the initial pharaonic project of “East Med”.

This forced adjustment to financial realism that was imposed by international “markets” is combined with the diplomatic dilemmas provoked by Turkey’s push for “dialogue” under international auspices. The government is facing strategic decisions: Should it accept now a potential to register profits through negotiations that will ultimately end up in the International Court of Justice in Hague, or should it continue a policy of hard rejectionism, in pursuit of a clear victory against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, by counting on the support of the US and the EU?

This dilemma is drawing lines of division. The “cautious wise ones” across the political spectrum support appealing to the International Court, estimating that a positive compromise with Turkey will be a positive solution for Greek capitalism. But this is not an easy route politically, since decades of nationalist rhetoric have formed maximalist expectations in the public opinion. Two former leaders of New Democracy, Antonis Samaras and Kostas Karamanlis, who used to remain “silent” when it came to commenting on Mitsotakis, have already made harsh statements warning they are not willing to tolerate “compromises on questions of the nation’s interests.” Greek political history proves that the rift in Greco-Turkish competition can provoke powerful political earthquakes, throwing into crisis governments that seemed otherwise strong.

Politics

It is in this framework that potential political developments and party dynamics play out, at least as presented by public opinion polls.

New Democracy retains political initiative and control of the situation. But its potential is weakened when compared to one year ago. The handling of the pandemic and especially the rigid refusal to support the NHS with personnel and equipment has provoked wears and tears and some loss in support. Resorting to a premature election today, New Democracy would come out on top, but it would probably lack enough support to form a government on its own. This could open up a period of political crisis, an “Italy-zation” of political life in quest of broad governmental alliances or even technocratic governments (the social-liberal Director of the Bank of Greece, Giannis Stournaras, does not shy away from his willingness to become a Greek Mario Draghi, if needed).

The choice of prime minister Mitsotakis to avoid an election—for now— and display a “rush forward” attitude on the economy and in imposing neoliberal counter-reforms, aims to take advantage of distributing the European funds, to make the most out of the political weaknesses of SYRIZA, and to reshape the political mainstream (by attracting forces of the liberal “center” and parts of degenerated social democrats)—in order to renew the hegemony of his party and the hegemony of his faction inside the party.

All these will be measured by his ability to impose the two major counter-reforms he had promised: the overhaul in labor law and the privatization of social security. Always under the condition that human life losses from the pandemic will be contained at “politically manageable” levels. In this sense, the next months will be crucial in shaping the social and political balance of forces in Greece.

It is noteworthy that in this political context where the government is weakened, SYRIZA is failing to build support. In all opinion polls, the difference in voting intentions between New Democracy and SYRIZA remains in double digits. One the one hand this serves as a political weapon in the arsenal of Mitsotakis. But it also serves as an obstacle to the leading group around Alexis Tsipras to finalize the mutation of SYRIZA into a “tasteless” “Progressive Alliance” which seeks for a return to government, by placing in the front seats the social democrats who have already jumped into Alexis Tsipras’ party. The surrounding feeling that a second successive political defeat by a political rival as hated as Mitsotakis is possible, weighs in as a factor in the internal debates of the party, which is engaged in a protracted pre-congressional period (with the question of when the 3^rd Congress will happen still open).

In these debates, two central questions have emerged:

First, the question of restoring some “confidence” in the policy of the party. The traumatic experience of 2015 has not vanished from people’s memories. SYRIZA’s failure to provide a slightly convincing self-criticism and an explanation of its retreat during “the first time,” one that could persuade that it won’t be repeated “the second time,” serves as an obstacle to Tsipras’ efforts to build a somewhat concrete and effective political current opposed to Mitsotakis.

Second, the question of whether the politics of the party are embedded in a strategic “cause”, in a left-wing “narrative” that presents itself as an alternative project of change in Greek society. The party leadership replies negatively to this question—both in words and in practice. One day it denounces neoliberalism and the next it votes in parliament in favor of an emblematic privatization—one that cedes a big part of the southern coast of Attica Region (Elliniko) in a scandalous way to the hands of the Latsis family, a powerful family of bankers and shipowners. One day it calls for reinforcing the NHS and the next it votes in favor of buying French Rafalle war planes. At the end of the day, it realizes that this tactic is not producing a “catch-all” result, as it used to happen to social democratic parties in the past. Instead, it accumulates losses, sometimes to the left, sometimes to the right. The electoral blackmail, the urgent feeling of a need to rally forces in rejection of Mitsotakis, is always possible to maintain an important electoral support for SYRIZA. But it is already obvious that the politics of Alexis Tsipras are not a reliable defense for our people against the right-wing attacks.

In the Communist Party, there have been some noteworthy developments. The Central Committee is revising certain ideological directions, mostly in relation to the history of the movement, adapting some positions that break with the Stalinist tradition. Meanwhile, in some sectors and fields, the CP forces are more “open”, at least temporarily, toward the prospect of unity in action. But the CC Documents ahead of the 21^st Party Congress leave no room for optimism: they warn that “positive conquests benefiting the working class”are impossible today, that these can be claimed if and when a “revolutionary situation” appears, when the question of “workers’ power” could be posed. As a consequence, the tasks of the party are to “show resilience” and “maintain its forces”, even if that means rejecting the demands of parts of the class to improve their situation here and now as “petty-bourgeois pressures.”It is a framework that warns that the Communist Party is limiting its ambitions in reproducing an electoral support at around 5-7 percent and that it is determined to keep its membership outside the “adventures” of trying to fightback against capitalist aggression in the here and now.

On the left of SYRIZA and the CP, noteworthy forces still exist. During the pandemic, in the struggles in hospitals, in schools and universities, among the youth, the forces of the radical and anti-capitalist Left played a distinct role. But they remain scattered and wounded by the defeat of 2015. Their political and programmatic growth must be pursued while “in movement,” during the course of trying to organize the social resistance against governmental policies. It is only under this condition that it could become possible for this political “space” to reclaim again the right to effectively intervene in central politics (and in elections).

The coming months in Greece will be far from smooth. The labor law, the privatization of social security, the repression in universities, will come up against resistance. This is where the future of Mitsotakis and the course of future developments will be determined. The forces of the Left, that appeared strengthened during this year’s Labor Day, had succeeded to successfully organize resistance in the past. This time they will be tested under more difficult conditions. Unfavorable changes in the lives and jobs of workers make the prospects of spontaneous upheavals more difficult. This retreat must be compensated by the serious and systematic efforts of the organized forces of the Left. This effort is where everything will be judged, where all of us will be judged.