Since January 19, 2023, France has been living at a time of major social mobilization against Emmanuel Macron’s new pension “reform” project. The rejection of the project is massive, a united inter-union (“intersyndicale”) has led mobilizations for more than two months, but the contents are still here, extremely threatening. Enough to question the strategy of struggle in place in view, particularly, of the precedents of social mobilizations that have existed for twenty years. It should be noted that these articles were drafted just before the government’s recourse to article 49.3* of the Constitution to impose its project.
(*simply put 49.3 means that the government (i.e., executive branch) can force the passage of a bill by decree bearing the former wins against a “no-confidence” vote of the parliament)
The following article (by Pepe Garralda, Gaston Lefranc, Michaël Lenoir, Luc Raisse, and Mario Toukour) is the first of a three-part series, first published in French at Tendance CLAIRE (pour le Communisme, la Lutte Auto-organisée, Internationaliste et Révolutionnaire) of the New Anti-capitalist Party (NPA) in France. The text is supported by the Clear Tendency of the NPA and the International Workers’ League. It has been translated into English by the International Socialism Project. The next two articles will also be republished here.
Putting the movement against Macron’s pension reform in a historical perspective
To properly analyze the dynamics and weaknesses of the current social movement, a return to the history of recent mobilizations is necessary. We have decided to limit ourselves to the great waves of interprofessional struggles of the past twenty years, therefore beginning in 2003. We deliberately leave aside here a social struggle of magnitude, because of its originality and the fact that we want to focus on the strategy of the union leaderships in this series of articles: the struggle of the Yellow Vests. Not that the latter doesn’t deserve to be mentioned! On the contrary: their struggle still deserves beautiful books of history and political sociology – some have already been published – and we can hope that the lessons of their example, but also of the limits of their movement, will inspire the new generations of struggle. The methods promoted by this social movement were almost point by point opposed to those prevailing at the top of the union leaderships and which have been implemented in class struggles since 2003. With their spontaneity and combativeness, the Yellow Vests succeeded in frightening the ruling class – let’s remember that a helicopter was even ready to exfiltrate Macron in case detachments of this unarmed army of the proletariat reached the Elysée Palace – and this movement has obtained some material gains for workers, which contrasts with the record of failure of social struggles since 2006.
It should also be noted that among these mass struggles we will only cover nationwide social movements lasting at least several weeks. But to grasp this period and its specificities, it is undoubtedly essential to begin by saying a few words about the previous great phase of interprofessional social struggle, the wave of strikes and demonstrations of November-December 1995, against the “Juppé Plan”. After this, a kind of rupture took place in the class struggle in France, and it is to this extent that 1995 offers some useful benchmarks.
November-December 1995, and after…
The plan of Prime Minister Chirac, supported by the leadership of the CFDT, was twofold targeting pensions and other social benefits. It was presented as necessary to “fight against deficits”, as part of the desire to “qualify France for the [implementation of the] single European currency”. The austerity measures concerned health insurance (including an annual law setting spending targets, penalties against doctors who exceeded the set targets, an increase in hospital access fees, a lowering of drug reimbursements, and an increase in health contributions for the unemployed and retired seniors); and family benefits (freezing and taxation of family allowances). For pensions, the plan aimed to generalize to civil servants and salaried workers of then public companies (RATP[Parisian public transport], SNCF [national railroads], EDF [national electric power company]) the measures that Balladur [former Prime Minister] had imposed on workers in the private sector two years earlier (in the name of “equity”…): no longer 37.5 but 40 years of necessary pension contributions. The social struggle, with massive open-ended strikes, especially in the transport sector (SNCF and RATP) did then force Juppé to back down on the question of public service pensions and special regimes, but Juppé had managed to impose himself on the “Sécu” [national social security] aspect and family allowances. But fundamentally, the great strikes and demonstrations of late 1995 were celebrated as a victory of the social movement and felt as such. 1995 [strike wave] is known to have been a “proxy strike”: massive in the public sector but much more limited in the private sector, despite the sympathy or even the support expressed there.
After this historical marker, the new millennium sees new social attacks carried out by the governments of the bourgeoisie, with differences but also common points that must be highlighted. We will do it in two stages. First, we will review successively the struggles concerning the same fundamental question that concerns us today: that of pensions during the movements of 2003, 2010 and 2019-2020. Then we will look at social battles waged on other terrains: the social movement of 2009 against Nicolas Sarkozy’s policy of “reform” and austerity; the 2016 struggle against the El Khomri law; finally, we will say a few words about the particular case of the fight against the CPE in 2006.
Struggles for pensions after 1995
The last three major interprofessional struggles against government attacks on our pensions have ended in failure, leading to significant and damaging setbacks for our class. Understanding why we lost in 2003, 2010 and 2019-2020 helps us understand what is still lacking today to inflict the defeat Macron and his government deserve.
2003: National Education in the lead, CFDT signs, CGT against an open-ended strike
In the first place, the mobilization framework of 2003 was, first and foremost, that of a broad inter-union (with the CFDT). But the peculiarity of this wave of struggle is that this inter-union exploded in flight. Secondly, in 2003, the major trade unions were much more conciliatory than they had been in 1995 – the year when Juppé broke his teeth against workers’ combativeness in the public sector – with the tropes of “social dialogue” and the search for a “shared diagnosis” with the government that had been prevailing for a long time. Then so-called “leapfrogging” days of action were set for the April 3rd, May 13th and 25th, and June 3rd and 10th. But in 2003, teachers in National Education went on strike massively, initially on specific sectoral issues, then becoming the locomotive of the movement against Fillon’s pension “reform” (some strikers having held for three months), with an open-ended strike on a largely self-organized basis. But the strike could not be extended to other sectors and faced an unfavorable trade union context. Not only because of the open betrayal of François Chérèque [head of CFDT union] who, on May 15th, signed an agreement with Fillon and withdrew from the movement; but also because of the blockade organized by the CGT leadership, which stifled attempts at interprofessional coordination and extinguished the hotbeds of potential renewal, especially at the SNCF, to finally stick to its calendar of days of action.
Autumn 2010: Eight national days of mobilization, isolated open-ended strikes
Unlike 2003, the struggle against the “Sarkozy reform” of pensions in 2010 took place in the context of a broad inter-union, including the most right-wing unions (CFDT, CFTC, CFE-CGC), and this framework was maintained until the end, that is to say until the burial of the social movement and its defeat. The movement against the “reform” project began in March, but it was especially in September and October that it became massive and strong. That year, no less than 14 days of demonstrations took place: on March 23rd, May 1st and 27th, June 15th and 24th; then on September 7th and 23rd, October 2nd, 12th, 16th, 19th and 28th, and on November 6th and 23rd, with a maximum reached probably on October 12th, when the unions counted 3.5 million demonstrators, while the police counted 1.23 million. It was especially from October 12th that we saw the beginning of open-ended strikes, particularly at the SNCF (with the CGT, Sud-Rail, FO and the CFDT-Cheminots and a significant participation of train operators); in some urban transport centers; in the 12 oil refineries still in operation at the time, which led to a severe shortage of fuel; among garbage collectors in certain cities, especially Marseille; among some truck drivers, with truck blockades, especially around strategic locations such as fuel depots; in some nurseries and school canteens. Add to this the strike and blockade of nearly a third of the universities and the blockade affecting several hundred High Schools. In some places, inter-professional coordination was set up and the self-organization of the strike prevailed (in Le Havre in particular).
But the leadership of the movement remained in the hands of the national inter-union which never abandoned its strategy of isolated strike days and “leapfrogging” demonstrations, even if these days were closer between October 12th and 19th. And this inter-union has always refused to call for a general strike until the withdrawal of the project, or even an open-ended strike on an inter-professional basis. Apart from Solidaires [union], the confederal union leaderships did not want it. At best, they allowed strikes to be built and renewed in the most advanced sectors, and when police repression attacked, especially against refinery workers, but also youth, the unions and interprofessional solidarity was not at all up to par.
Winter 2019-2020: SNCF and RATP at the peak… and days of action
Closer to home, Macron’s first attempt to smash our pensions was met with an incomplete inter-union framework, less broad than in 2010. In 2019, the CFDT was in favor of important aspects of the “reform” of Macron and his Prime Minister Edouard Philippe. The struggle of the winter of 2019-2020 combined two main elements: a massive open-ended strike in transport (RATP and SNCF, at the call of all representative unions in these sectors) from December 5th, 2019; and a series of days of action (strikes and demonstrations) called by an inter-union composed of CGT, FO, FSU and Solidaires and four student organizations. On December 5th, the strike, already followed by a majority at SNCF and RATP, became so in the National Education, and it was strong in sectors such as EDF or the Civil Service; and the demonstrations gathered between 806,000 (police estimate) and 1.5 million people (CGT estimate). On the other hand, few sectors other than SNCF and RATP had gone on open-ended strike. By December 10th, the numbers of strikers and demonstrators were already falling. On December 17th, a new interprofessional day of strikes and demonstrations, with the CFE-CGC, joined by the CFDT, the CFTC and the UNSA, without joining the inter-union: a mobilization with increase participation but remaining lower than the initial day of December 5th.
During the school holidays, the strike continued at the SNCF and the RATP, but the inter-union did not propose anything – leaving the sectors on open-ended strike fending for themselves – except to wait until January 9th for a new day of action. No shift towards a more favorable balance of power that day, but police violence on the rise. Then the 5th National Day of Demonstrations takes place on January 11th, the 6th on January 16th, and the 7th on the 24th. Meanwhile, the strike logically weakens at SNCF and RATP when, on January 17th, most subway conductors voted to return to work. The struggle takes other forms: notably public solidarity performances at the Paris Opera, torchlight retreats, electric power cuts, intrusions at the headquarters of the CFDT, disruption of a play attended by Macron…
But the struggle had already lost… Except that the inter-union continued to produce days of action and demonstrations, which followed a curve of participation always tendentially declining, until exhaustion (as in 2010): January 29th and February 6th and 20th … They shoot horses, don’t they?! Finally, it was the arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic that interrupted the debates on the law as well as the opposition to it, already defeated in practice. Without the coronavirus, this reform would probably already be in force.
Other struggles of the last twenty years
A few words about the social movement of 2009
Let us add the summary of two other waves of social struggles, motivated by issues other than pensions, in order to see to what extent their lessons corroborate what emerges from the movements presented above.
The first half of 2009 was marked by a series of days of strikes and demonstrations in opposition to Sarkozy’s policies of “reforms” and austerity, in the wake of the stock market crash of 2007-2008. A vast inter-union (8 union federations) was formed and then produced a string of days of action (calls for strikes and demonstrations), on January 29th (between 1 and 2.5 million demonstrators depending on the sources), March 19th (between 1.2 and 3 million), then on May 1st (between 465,000 and 1.2 million) and a first-class funeral on June 13th (between 9,000 and 30,000 people in the street).
2016: Facing the El Khomri law, trade unions, “head processions”, and Nuit Debout
Another notable social movement in the fairly recent period: the fight against the labor law (or El Khomri) in 2016. It was a bill aimed at “relaxing” labor law, i.e., decreasing protections for workers and making life easier for employers, in particular through the inversion of the hierarchy of standards, between the level of the company, that of the branch and the national level with the Labor Code.
This is taking place in a context important to note: the country had been in a state of emergency since the attacks of November 13, 2015, and this state of emergency had been extended three times. The Hollande-Valls [left-wing] government used this villainous device to terrorize demonstrators with police violence – also against journalists – and to criminalize opponents to the bill. Compared to other French social movements of the period after the year 2000, that of 2016 presents a certain number of originalities.
The struggle began on March 9th, with between 224,000 and 500,000 people, many of them High School students, demonstrating for the withdrawal of this bill. On the 17th of March, youth organizations, trade unions and politicians still mobilized between 69,000 and 150,000 people in France. Then came the day of March 31st, when some trade union confederations committed themselves (mainly CGT and FO) with between 390,000 and 1.2 million demonstrators. High Schools closed by picketing, arrests and police violence were on the rise. It was at this time that Nuit Debout [Up all night] appeared, an original form of mobilization in France, with a call on social networks to occupy the Place de la République. The militant project was, following the occupations of squares in Spain, the United States etc. to reclaim public spaces to debate and do politics differently, from the bottom up. “Free tolls” operations were used to finance the mobilization and multiplied throughout the movement. Nuit Debout settled in the long term, every evening on the Place de la République, and extended to some provincial cities, in a more modest way, and especially not daily. Actions were organized, as for example in Dijon where demonstrators Nuit Debout invested the regional council and tried to speak there, which was refused to them, before their evacuation by the police. In addition, a phenomenon emerged during the 2016 movement: that of “cortège de tête” [black block]. Made up of hardcore activists who were not afraid to engage with the cops – a police force under the orders of the Minister of the Interior Bernard Cazeneuve, which showed increasing brutality and propensity for “contact” with the demonstrators – the “black blocks” were made up of diverse far left groups, including anarchist and autonomous, which did not hesitate to criticize the movement’s strategy formulated mainly by union leadership.
Regardless of this, the union leaderships that participated in the movement proposed, again and again, more days of action. This is the case on April 9th, with lukewarm results (110,000 in Paris and several thousand in some provincial cities – Toulouse, Lyon, Bordeaux, Nantes in particular); then on April 28th, with some 200 marches in France with between 170,000 and 500,000 demonstrators. The May 1st parades were generally poorly attended, and on May 10th, 2016, Manuel Valls used article 49.3 of the Constitution to impose the El Khomri law, even Hollande and Valls himself had spoken in favor of the deletion of this [antidemocratic constitutional] article! Demonstrations then took place, the Concorde bridge was occupied, on May 12 new demonstrations took place, clashes between Black Blocks and police became more frequent. The inter-union was still calling for demonstrations on May 17th (not very well attended) and May 19th, the day when the mobilization participation recovers (400,000 people in the streets according to the CGT).
It was on this date that a strike movement began, among truckers, railway workers, salaried refineries, ports, and airports workers. The government managed to defuse the movement of truck drivers by promising them that the new law would not penalize them in terms of their overtime, which obeyed a specific regime [specific working exemptions]. Faced with closed refineries and oil depots, he sent the CRS [National Guard] to Fos-sur-Mer wielding water cannons and firing flash-balls. But the movement held in the eight refineries, creating fuel shortages in some gas stations. Several nuclear power plants had to reduce their electricity production. But on June 3rd, few refineries returned to work. As of June 9th, a poll indicated that 59% of French people still supported the social movement against the El Khomri bill; and on the 16th, another poll showed that 64% of the population wanted the withdrawal of this bill.
On June 14th, the inter-union succeeded in [organizing] a strong national demonstration in Paris and FO counted 1.3 million demonstrators in 53 cities throughout the country, against 125,000 according to the police. Police violence was multiplying, the maneuvers of the cops too, and we saw the Black Blocks more and more often at work. The stubbornness of Valls – who sought to ban demonstrations – and the “socialist” power, was opposed by a radicalized part of the social movement. It is in this context that on June 23rd, after much hesitation, the government only authorized a merry-go-round demonstration from Bastille to basin de l’Arsenal back to Bastille, a grotesque authoritarian quite new of its kind… The end of June was tense, with the most motivated elements of the movement now attacking the headquarters of the union leaderships (the CFDT traitors who want to renegotiate the law; and also, CGT). June 28th was still a day of demonstrations, in sharp decline (between 64,000 and 200,000 throughout the France), but still with radicalized sectors, violent cops and clashes.
On June 30th, the unions CGT, FO, FSU, Solidaires, Unef, UNL and Fidl called for “continued mobilizations, of nature to be determined locally, during the parliamentary debate, especially on July 5th”, in a joint communiqué following an inter-union meeting, the latter desiring to continue to protest during July by means other than demonstrations. It will be especially the “free tolls” operations [i.e., letting automobiles freely pass through privately-operated freeway tolls] during this holiday period. But on July 20th, the 4th version of the bill was adopted by force by article 49.3 even if the MEDEF [French CEOs syndicate] , initially favorable, had said it was very disappointed at the end of June and had come to criticize its complexity. August saw a very clear decline in the movement, with some purely local actions. Until the end of the year, several trade union demonstrations and specific actions meekly challenged a class law, totally unjust and imposed in an authoritarian fashion.
So what about the fight against the CPE in 2006?
To be complete, we must also say a word about the struggle of 2006 (under the [right wing] Chirac-Villepin government) against the CPE (first employment contract, a discriminatory employment contract designed for young workers, under the pretext of promoting their integration into the working world). Unlike all the other struggles of the past twenty years, this one ended in success: the government ended up withdrawing its project. It is therefore necessary to grasp the specificity of the 2006 struggle compared to others.
The text establishing the CPE was adopted by parliament on March 31st, despite strong opposition from universities (with massive general assemblies and quickly effective national student coordination) and High Schools at the beginning of February. The mobilization had spread to workers’ unions, leading, after demonstrations going crescendo, to two major days of mobilization, on March 18th (with between 530,000 and 1.5 million demonstrators throughout the country) and especially on March 28th (with an interprofessional strike and between 1,055,000 and 3 million demonstrators). Despite the vote in parliament, the unions and the student movement continued to demand the repeal of the law, and Villepin decided on April 10th to withdraw it, judging that the conditions for its application were not met.
Admittedly, in this case, the inter-union also organized days of action, but it is important to remember that the universities were massively on strike, many High Schools were closed, and that the cooperation between university and High School students did not give in on the demands, pushing the inter-union to a firmness that it had not shown at all in 2003 on the issue of pensions.
Moreover – and this certainly counts for a lot – we saw the right-wing presidential majority (UMP) split on this occasion, for reasons that probably had little to do with the welfare of young workers. Nicolas Sarkozy began to position himself in 2006 for his candidacy for the 2007 presidential election, aware that Villepin’s unpopularity due to the CPE was for him a boon not to be missed. This required pushing to “suspend” (or even withdraw) the text already voted in parliament, and this is what Sarkozy did, as well as the fraction of the UMP he led, saying he feared, in particular, a union between the “far left” and “young people from the projects”.
Finally, we can probably add another reason to what was considered a large victory (the repeal of the CPE, when the text had already been voted) – it was also the last victory (purely defensive by the way) of the workers’ movement to date – and that is that the Chirac-Villepin government, although right-wing, was undoubtedly much more hesitant to confront the social movement than those who followed it (under Sarkozy, Hollande and Macron), much tougher and intransigent, not afraid to go to confrontation and force their way. This has indeed been the evolution, and it is also one of the criticisms that Sarkozy made to Chirac and his predecessors in the UMP and at the head of the State: to have always yielded to social movements!
Here are some essential aspects of this historical fresco of social struggles of the last two decades. Armed with it, we will undoubtedly be able to better understand the present social struggle. Our next article will present the main data and the strategic and organizational framework of the 2023 movement.
