State election in Saxony-Anhalt: Has the firewall become obsolete?

Germany is holding four state elections this September, but none has been more anticipated and talked about than the one in Saxony-Anhalt, which just took place on Sunday, September 6. The reason being that it has been known for some time that the far-right AfD had a real chance of winning outright, with exit polls showing the party at around 40%. While the AfD has been at times tolerated by democratic parties as well as ruled outright at a municipal level for some time, the so-called Brandmauer or firewall strategy of democratic parties to not cooperate with the AfD has so far held up at a state and federal level. However, we are reaching a point where this strategy is rapidly becoming obsolete, since the AfD is simply getting too strong and may soon even be able to rule in a single-party majority government in future elections.

Three topics dominated the election campaign:

Migration (the AfD together with other neo-Nazis prefer the term and concept of “remigration” – i.e. forcefully returning immigrants to their countries of birth, including naturalized German citizens who a are deemed to not have sufficiently assimilated).
Russia (the AfD is pro-Putin and wants to end German support for Ukraine).
The continuing economic disparity between Eastern Germany (the former GDR) and the rest of the country (many residents, especially elderly on a limited, fixed income, are struggling financially and feel left behind).

While one could argue that the first two topics are more ideology-driven and depend on one’s perspective, the last topic is quite objectively true and a very serious electoral issue. It is perceived to not be properly addressed by the remaining political parties, unfortunately including Die Linke. It has by now been largely acknowledged even in the bourgeois press that the two former countries may have reunited geo-politically into one Germany, but significant cultural and economic differences remain. Worse, rather than gradually approaching Western German standards, all poor economic indicators for Eastern Germany seem to be perpetuating themselves. The German sociologist Steffen Mau speaks in this context of a Verstetigung ostdeutscher Eigenheiten or “‘The solidification of East German characteristics: Cultural, socio-economic, and political differences don’t just stick around, they keep reproducing themselves—and shape specific East German ways of life and experiences.” (1)

Die Linke stopped being the mouthpiece of the East some time ago

While Die Linke was for the longest time considered the Ostpartei, or the party that most represented Eastern German constituents, this has drastically shifted for a number of reasons: First, Die Linke shifted its focus increasingly on electoral politics in Western Germany starting in the mid- to late 2000’s, thus slowly diluting the undivided attention it had formerly paid to Eastern Germany. Furthermore, in certain states of Eastern Germany, such as Thuringia, for example, Die Linke has been in power for so long, that for some voters it has become part of the despised “political establishment” or Altparteien, old parties, in AfD parlance. In other instances, Die Linke has fallen prey to a neoliberal consensus and supported public spending cuts in coalitions with the Social Democrats (SPD), which further tarnished its image, due to the disconnect with its generally anti-austerity rhetoric. Finally, Sarah Wagenknecht’s exit and formation of a new party, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht – Vernunft und Gerechtigkeit, or BSW for short, has made an impact. While supposedly created to confront and lure votes away from the AfD with similar talking points on migration mixed with some left-wing positions, it is by now clear that the BSW has not only failed to stop the rise of the AfD but has significantly harmed Die Linke at the ballot box in the process.

Seemingly unstoppable ascent of the AfD

The AfD has successfully maneuvered its way into the opening that Die Linke left for them in Eastern Germany. In the case of Saxony-Anhalt, these efforts have been spearheaded by the local AfD leader Ulrich Siegmund. A charming, media-savvy 35-year-old, with over 800,000 followers on TikTok, he was recently dubbed the “most dangerous man in Germany” by German news magazine Der Spiegel. While the magazine cover and article were meant to alert readers to his documented neo-Nazi ties, Siegmund managed to turn this around and use it as advertising for his campaign by signing copies of the magazine publicly. He has also been clever in tapping into the common sentiment of Ostalgie, or nostalgia for the East (i.e. a longing for certain cultural icons and brands of the former GDR, but also the social security aspects that were part of the regime, such as free childcare, subsidized housing and guaranteed employment). One example is Siegmund organizing a recent meet-up of “Simson” moped enthusiasts, a make that was highly popular in the former GDR. This gathering was quite a success and got significant media attention. Another is Siegmund’s steady use of slogans that appeal to a nostalgic base instinct, such as Wieder normal leben, or Live normal again and Ich möchte mein gutes, altes, sicheres Deutschland zurück – I want my good old, secure Germany back.

Election results

In the end, the AfD fell just shy of getting sufficient votes for a single-party majority, yet we are still talking of a whopping 43.8% which translates to 39 seats (out of 83) and sent shockwaves throughout Germany. The AfD more than doubled their last state election result of 20.8% in 2021! The Christian Democrats (CDU), who came in second, got a mere 17.2% this time around. Their loss is almost as big as the AfD’s gain, indicating some strong migration of votes from the CDU to the AfD. Die Linke came in at 8.6%, down 2.4 percentage points from 2021. Both the SPD and the Greens came in slightly higher than 2021 at 9.3% and 8.9% respectively. It is too early to tell what will happen in terms of coalition-building on behalf of the Altparteien. If everybody joined together, the AfD could potentially be prevented from fielding the prime minister in Saxony-Anhalt, but that would have to include Die Linke. Sarah Wagenknecht, not entirely surprisingly, appears to be open to at least entering talks with the AfD. Her group BSW got 5.3% and the AfD has made several appeals for cooperation in the past, since both groups are anti-immigration. Regardless of what may happen, Germany has firmly joined the rest of Europe with this election result. While one may be tempted to normalize the outcome this way, there is one major caveat here – Germany is still the country where Nazism and thus the Holocaust originated.

What can Die Linke do?

It is quite likely that significant external pressure will be applied on Die Linke to form some sort of broad coalition to prevent the AfD from being in power. This would be somewhat similar to the popular front approach we saw in Spain in the 1930’s. While it is imperative to prevent the AfD from governing, Die Linke would be better off refraining from being part in such a coalition, precisely in order to shed the image of being just another Altpartei. That is the dilemma.

Immediately, Die Linke needs to close ranks again with extra-parliamentary anti-fascist movements as it has done on many occasions in the past. Die Linke also needs to sharpen its socialist and anti-capitalist profile in action. This should resonate with East Germans who are disgruntled and feel left behind by the system. However, trust needs to be rebuilt first and that can only come about through direct involvement in the communities again. Something similar to the successful doorstep campaign launched during the general election may be a first step but needs to be more permanent. This is not about getting the vote out for one election but listening to people’s concerns and empowering them into becoming main actors in shaping their own future, ultimately in a differently run society.

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