Latin America today is a site of very powerful class conflict, repression and extremely violent attacks by reactionary forces. Franck Gaudichaud introduces our dossier addressing the situation in these countries and the dynamics of these struggles. This interview, conducted by Antoine Pelletier, originally appeared on the Web site of the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) in France.
Until a few months ago, many had spoken of the end of the “progressive cycle” in Latin America. Since then, a new situation seems to be developing. On the one hand, the dominant classes remain on the offensive; on the other hand, resistance to neoliberalism is being expressed in the streets and at the polls.
There was a debate as to whether we were, strictly speaking, witnessing an “end” of a cycle of progressive, popular or centre-left national governments—from the violent end of the rule of the Workers’ Party in Brazil to the endless crisis in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro, including Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador… In reality, what we’re seeing is more than the “end” of these experience, but an “ebb,” that renders all the strategic limits and contradictions of these various projects and political regimes more apparent than ever. I refer to the essay on this subject that has just been published in French by Syllepse1. Thanks to the global economic crisis and the more or less pronounced exhaustion of “progressive” neodevelopmentalist and neoextractivist projects (in particular), we have entered a turbulent, chaotic situation, where the dominant classes, conservative sectors, media elites, the financial bourgeoisies, evangelical churches and extreme militarist rights are everywhere on the offensive. This is particularly true following the election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, a key geostrategic country in the region. Bolsonaro’s victory followed the parliamentary coup against Dilma Roussef and Lula’s illegal imprisonment.
At the same time, there is absolutely no stability to this conservative and reactionary offensive. It seems that the dominant classes haven’t found the key to reestablishing, with certain levels of consensus, openly conservative-authoritarian hegemony. In Argentina, the neoliberal Mauricio Macri was defeated at the polls following a term in office that was marked by a dramatic economic collapse, despite—or, we should say, “because of”—the gigantic IMF loan package that Christine Lagarde approved. The progressive trend arrived late in Mexico with the victory of López Obrador (center-left). López Obrador probably will not bring about his promised “great transformation”, but nevertheless, his victory acted as a “brake” on the policies of previous neoliberal president. In Venezuela, the Washington-supported opposition offensive with Juan Guaidó proclaiming himself president in late January and with the economic strangulation of the country, has failed miserably. However, the Maduro government remains extremely weak, marked by authoritarianism and mass corruption and unable to reignite the economy in the face of US sanctions. Crucially, the Bolivarian Armed Forces have remained loyal to the government. As a counterpoint to this, we could mention Uruguay, where the right has just put an end to 15 years of social-democratic governments of the Frente Amplio, after a narrow victory in the second round of elections.
In the face of this unstable conservative offensive, there has been a sharp increase in popular discontent and collective resistance, which is expressed indirectly at the polls, with, for example, the victory of Peronism in Argentina, but above all from “below”, with a resurgence of social struggle. We’re experiencing a recomposition of extremely strong class struggles, which is shaping a period marked by uncertainty from the point of view of both the dominant and the working classes. The popular movements are trying to reorganize themselves, but in a context in which they have been knocked back and which they are in need of drawing critical assessments of the previous period, that of the progressive “golden age” (2002-2013). Another important fact: the breadth of state repression and the criminalization of popular movements, with dozens of deaths around the region (from Chile to Haiti to Bolivia), torture, rapes and femicides committed by militarized police forces, disappearances and illegal detentions. In my opinion, those of us in Europe face an urgent need: What type of broad and united international solidarity campaign can we build to put an immediate halt on this state terrorism? How can we increase the pressure on our own governments, who look the other way or who fully support, the states responsible for these systematic violations of fundamental rights?
In Chile, Ecuador, Haiti and now Colombia, the list of popular movements is growing. What can we say about these movements, their roots and perspectives?
According to several observers, after the Arab springs or the movement of the indignados in the Spanish state, we are still in a context of global revolts and the Latin American insurrections resonate with the distant echoes of movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Hong Kong, or even with those of the Yellow Vests in France. It may be a generality to say so, but it is indeed resistance to neoliberalism and against authoritarianism, in a context of crises of legitimacy of the existing political systems, perceived as dominated by political castes, where clientelism, bribery and corruption prevail. If we are talking about Chile, Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, it’s clear. Still, we’re dealing with “globalized” struggles that revolve around local and national considerations (even if there are real mutual influences, notably via social media). This rejection of the system has different dimensions, more or less strong depending on the country: the question of corruption, central to Haiti, the question of the economic model and authoritarianism in Chile, Ecuador and Colombia. These are crises that arise from the widespread precariousness of life, nature and work in the neoliberal era in the countries of the South. We really need to take the pulse of discontent accumulated over recent decades, of the daily hardship for millions of people to live and to get housing in large cities or in rural areas polluted and controlled by transnationals and, also, to understand the rage of the dispossessed on grasping the inability of “weakly democratic” political regimes to meet expectations, while the rich continue to get richer.
The petty bourgeoisie (the “middle classes”) seems to play an important role in popular demonstrations, but with different trajectories.
In Chile, we have seen above all an explosion of youth in precarious economic circumstances. High school students, often very young, have jumped the barriers of the metro and refused to pay the 30 cent increase for one of the most expensive metro systems in the world (in terms of purchasing power). They are really young people from working class sectors or from the middle classes in precarious situations. Overall, in the South, vast sections of the petty-bourgeoisie are in precarious situations, indebted and without stable work, and end up following and supporting popular mobilizations. An important element is the level of education. We now have a Latin American youth (urban but also rural) who are educated, much more qualified, connected to social media, much less attached to political parties and trade unions than in the 1970s. They enter the struggle in a more or less spontaneous and very “explosive” way, responding to immediate issues, and at different times depending on the country.
Thus, the anti-neoliberal, anti-authoritarian and democratic content of the ongoing movements is very clear in Chile, Ecuador, Haiti and now Colombia, with a national strike on a scale not seen in decades. At the same time, there are local ingredients that are essential. The issue of the peace process is essential in Colombia, and the Duque government has done everything it can to torpedo it. In Chile, Piñera’s ruling-class arrogance and the militarization of public space have accelerated mobilization (bringing back traumatic memories of Pinochet’s dictatorship). In Ecuador, the Moreno government has aligned itself with neoliberalism, the IMF, the United States and Guayaquil’s big bosses. In Haiti, it is the rejection of the corrupt caste and of President Jovenel, but also the consequences of 15 years of occupation of the country by UN troops, particularly Brazilian troops.
Bolivia has taken a distinct path: there is also a real accumulated discontent not with neoliberalism but with the “caudillismo” (political bossism) of Evo Morales, who tried to run for a fourth term, despite the result of the 2016 referendum [in which the voters rejected an additional term]. Despite the significant reduction in poverty and the construction of a more social and plurinational state, there are also many criticisms of the extractivist development model, and a growing divide between the government and part of the popular movement. However, the crucial fact that explains the coup against Evo was the ability of the hard right, including the Santa Cruz Civic Committee [one of the main opposition organizations, centered on the wealthy and agribusiness in the eastern region of Santa Cruz] and the evangelical currents, to capitalize on this discontent. Camacho, the neo-fascist leader of the eastern plains, has thus taken the lead in this heterogeneous movement in which popular sectors, large landowners, Indian organizations and employers find themselves, taking advantage of the weakness of the former governing party, the Movement to Socialism (MAS), which has lost part of its ability to mobilize its historical foundations. We are therefore in a different balance of power. The shift of the new middle classes to support the coup also played a role. They benefited from 15 years of MAS rule, including the tripling of the GDP. Now they have other expectations, to which the MAS did not respond. At the same time, relations between the social organizations and the MAS, which were fundamentally clientalist, didn’t serve to protect the government in the face of this type of destabilization. Finally, we need to study and to understand in detail how imperialist intervention, which appears to be more decisive every day, contributed, not only through the OAS denunciation of electoral fraud in 2019, but through its support of opposition forces trying to topple Morales since 2005.
The feminist movement seems particularly strong in Latin America. Can we talk about a new feminist wave crossing the continent?
Women’s struggles and the feminist movement are a key factor in the recomposition of class struggles and the oppositional popular movement in the region. They are very much rooted in the youth, and not only among students. They have succeeded in establishing links with part of the trade union movement and the peasant movement. This is seen, for example, with the importance of the women’s and feminist movement in popular struggles in Brazil and the landless movement.
At the same time, it is a broad, continental, transnational movement with local specificities. The Argentine dynamic had an influence on Chile, particularly with the powerful “Ni una menos” movement against violence against women and the struggle for abortion, with the symbol of the green scarf also becoming international. This movement will thus transcend borders and inspire the struggles of Chilean feminists on the other side of the cordillera [i.e. the mountain range that runs along the Argentine-Chilean border]. These have their own demands and dynamics, particularly following the mass university occupation in 2018 and against sexual abuse within the universities. The movement exploded with the massive March 2019 strike and the creation of the Coordinadora del 8 de Marzo, which brought together dozens of organizations. The Latin American feminist movement in the last period demonstrated that it is possible to combine a unitary and radical approach, while becoming a mass, popular movement. It embodies a great hope, in my opinion, for any prospect of a profound democratic transformation, not only anti-patriarchal, but also decolonizing and anti-capitalist. Thus, in Chile, it is a movement that defines itself “against the precariousness of life”, and therefore includes workers, migrants, Mapuche and indigenous demands, LGBTQI+ struggles, etc.
In Mexico, the fight against neoliberal violence and the large number of femicides (and not only in Ciudad Juarez) has been a central focus of this movement. But it has not yet been transformed into a massive national movement. There have also been advances in terms of decriminalizing abortion (in Oaxaca state and in Mexico City). In Brazil, feminists’ struggles in the “Ele Não” (“not him”) campaign against the rise of Bolsonaro or the “daisy march” of hundreds of thousands of rural women in August 2019 illustrate this. The latter was a massive and popular march, born of a community-based and popular feminism. Radical left-wing urban-based activists, like Marielle Franco—murdered by Bolsonaro’s henchmen—helped organize this mobilization.
There is therefore a new feminist “wave” but not in the European or American sense. It is rather a new historical and very important moment of women’s struggles and feminisms (which are plural). It includes influences from the North, the movement in the Spanish State and the women’s strike, and relates to theorists like Sylvia Federici, Cinzia Arruzza and others, but it starts from, and is above all anchored in, the specificities of Latin America.
Other socio-political actors are particularly important in several Latin American situations: peasant and indigenous movements. How can we understand the progressive role of such forces, and in particular their link to the workers’ movement?
As we commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Indian, peasant, anti-neoliberal and neo-Zapatista anti-capitalist rebellion in Chiapas, I think we would be well advised to learn from this crucial experience and also to reactivate solidarity networks with this experience. It has lasted for a quarter of a century, on a territory as large as Belgium, and has undertaken the construction of alternative forms of government and living in this world in crisis. The Zapatistas have also succeeded in resisting the attacks of the Mexican military forces and in building, on the positive side, a new picture on how to try, as best as we can, to forge a post-capitalist perspective, while being open to all international struggles such as that of the Kurds and many other struggles. It’s raising the question of communalism but starting from the coordinates of the Mayan peoples of Chiapas, developing the confluence between Indian territories and the construction of an innovative democratic political power, etc. This experience is fundamental when considering alternatives in the 21st century. There are, of course, limits and many unresolved problems (especially economic ones), as they themselves acknowledge. Their relationship with the rest of the Mexican left is also often difficult. But when we see the collapse of Chavismo in Venezuela, the absence of structural transformation in Argentina, the trajectory of the PT in Brazil or the Broad Front in Uruguay, the 15-year record of “progressivism” is rather mixed! In my opinion, we must therefore return to the Zapatista experience and its conception of power from “below”, without falling back into the strategic rut of “changing the world without taking power”: let us change the world by transforming power, as the Zapatistas seem to tell us…
Concerning the actors mobilized in the rest of the sub-continent, one could venture to say that we are witnessing the return to the mass popular resistance that we saw in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, during the great confrontations with neoliberalism, with CONAIE [The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador] in Ecuador, the dynamics of the landless movement in Brazil, the water and gas was in Bolivia, the Argentinazo in 2001 in Argentina, or even before, in the urban riots of the 1989 “Caracazo” in Venezuela. These are varied, multiple actors, coming from social formations where the “popular” encompasses a large multiplicity of actors and fractions of classes. Recently, we saw again—depending on the country— very strong Indian and campesino movements, some connected and some not, to those in the city, students and workers, the homeless, the unemployed (piqueteros)—the same forces who opened the “post-neoliberal” political cycle at the beginning of the 21st century.
Today, there is a new plebeian eruption, in which indigenous people, as we have seen in Ecuador, play a central role. They were able to shake Lenín Moreno’s neo-conservative government. In Brazil, it will be necessary to see how the landless movement will position itself, because its links with the Workers Party have long been very strong, but have paralyzed it. But with the movement against the dams (MAB), the Daisy Movement, around the Amazon and in the face of the offensive of the extreme right, there is a reactivation of resistance. The peasant and indigenous sectors are the main targets of neoliberal attacks. They are also among those disillusioned with the progressive governments. They are therefore a very important actor. While Evo Morales is in exile in Mexico, it is the Poncho Rojos (an Aymara militia and political organization, originally from the region of Lake Titicaca that spans Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Chile) who are on the offensive to challenge the ultra-violent dimension of the Bolivian coup d’état.
This does not prevent there from also being fundamental workers’ and urban resistance. In Ecuador, it was coming together of the urban and indigenous movements that gave national impetus to the revolt against Lenín Moreno. In Chile, the movement comes mainly from the urban populations, city youth and students, from a section of the petty-bourgeois but also from the labor movement: the Chilean Longshore Union is at the heart of the current revolt and the national strike movement as well as the union organizations in the la Mesa de la Unidad Social (the Social Unity Roundtable) also feeds this revolt. In my opinion, this is even where the outcome of the Chilean crisis will be decided: the ability of the working class to join the national movement and to shut down the economy will be the decisive battle against Piñera and state repression, the level of which hasn’t been seen since 1990.
But there are contradictions on this side too: in Bolivia, part of the leadership of the Bolivian Workers’ Center (COB), in its break with Morales, supported the coup d’état! The workers’ movement is therefore not always ready for battle, far from it. The large union federations, the Chilean CUT and the Brazilian CUT, find it difficult to regenerate a resistance movement against extreme right-wing and neoliberal governments because they have long acted as “transmission belts” for the center-left progressive parties. And one of the challenges of this period is precisely to rebuild a combative trade unionism, rooted in the workplace and independent of the institutions (i.e. political parties and the government).
1 Available for download in Spanish at: http://ciid.politicas.unam.mx/www/libros/gobiernos_progresistas_electronico.pdf.
Paul D'Amato is the author of The Meaning of Marxism and was the editor of the International Socialist Review. He is the author of numerous articles on a wide array of topics.
