We publish here a translation of Venezuelan environmentalist Emiliano Terán Mantovani’s analysis of the “oil deal” with Venezuela that President Trump announced last month. Translation by the International Socialist Project. See the original here.
The recurring questions about who will control the oil industry and revenues, or how Venezuela will benefit, must be contrasted with the clear evidence of how the plundering of the country is being reorganized under different structures and modalities; how an imperial/oligarchic-national pact is being consolidated, dismantling the historic Republic to promote a restructuring of the country that facilitates the massive appropriation of cheap natural resources, territories, rents, surpluses, and, eventually, cheap labor . What is to be done?
I. General features of the Trump-Rodriguez New Oil Deal: huge reserves ceded, NABEP and the War Department
On August 28, a massive oil deal was announced between the government of Donald Trump and the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez. Trump touted it as the “largest in history.” Trump claimed that the US was taking control of a significant portion of Venezuela’s oil reserves “at no cost to the American taxpayer,” and that his country’s reserves would more than double. [1]
Such announcements stand in stark contrast to the lack of detailed information, beyond a few fact sheets, speeches, and social media posts. But this void and these arbitrary actions have become commonplace in Venezuela in recent decades: both in the way the Maduro government managed the country and currently under US tutelage following the military intervention of January 3, 2026. Curious authoritarian continuities.
It is also curious because these opacities are based specifically on the exploitation of no less than 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves [2], which is equivalent to one-fifth of the country’s total reserves. There is no precedent for such an agreement in the century-long history of the national oil industry.
The White House Fact Sheet of August 31 [3] touts 100-year concessions for 17 oil fields, although Delcy Rodríguez referred to a 25-year term for the agreement between the two countries. These 17 fields are among the best and located in the most productive regions : several projects in Lake Maracaibo, others in northern Zulia state, and others in the Orinoco Oil Belt [4] (FPO). While most of them have installed capacity and production, a few are still under development.
And there’s much more: beyond just an agreement between governments, what we have is a binational framework of energy guidelines that will be implemented and operationalized by a Venezuelan company that was not only little known until this agreement—founded in 2024—but whose founders, and its current CEO, Alejandro Betancourt, have been involved in corruption schemes that have had an enormous impact on Venezuela . The company:North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) [5] , based in Barbados, which would suddenly become the private company with the second largest reserves in the world. Betancourt was president of Derwick Associates, notorious for being involved in one of the biggest corruption cases linked to Venezuela’s electricity crisis [6] , which contributed to leaving the national system in ruins, with the well-known humanitarian, social, and economic consequences.
Alejandro Betancourt has faced investigations in Venezuela, as well as in the United States, Spain, and Switzerland, for alleged corruption and money laundering offenses. He was arrested twice in the United Kingdom in 2025 on extradition requests from Spain and Switzerland [7] . Thus, once again, it is necessary to highlight the continuities of corruption and authoritarianism in the Delcy-Trump-backed puppet government . We came from years of “in the dark” oil management under the Maduro regime, where brokers, unknown private oilmen, and shell companies proliferated—also as a mechanism to circumvent international sanctions. In this context, Betancourt was already operating alongside Harry Sargeant III, securing contracts for various activities in the Venezuelan oil industry, culminating in the founding of NABEP and its signing of agreements with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) [the state-owned oil company] and Corporación Venezolana del Petróleo (CVP) [a subsidiary of PDVSA] in 2024. The “proven track record” of this company, called out in the White House Fact Sheet, refers to how NABEP managed to increase its total production to 200,000 barrels per day (Lake Maracaibo and FPO) [8] , becoming the second largest private producer in Venezuela after Chevron. Following this, Alex Saab left and Alejandro Betancourt reappeared.
It is highly emblematic and representative of this new/old formula of plunder and impunity that it is precisely an entity like NABEP that will execute such an extractive agreement. In the case of Venezuela, it perpetuates an oligarchic model of concealment, arbitrariness, and crony capitalism that can intensify extractivism and perpetuate the ruling power structure. NABEP, therefore, acts as a hinge between transnational chains of massive wealth appropriation at Venezuela’s expense.
As for the United States, it should be noted that its government can veto the appointment of members to NABEP’s board of directors; the majority of these members must be American. Agreements and disputes are governed by U.S. law and subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. Furthermore, NABEP transfers 35 percent of its stake in its parent company to the Office of Strategic Capital in the U.S. Department of Defense. This last point is highly significant, as it demonstrates the military logic underlying access to resources, as expressed in the so-called “Donroe Doctrine,” where agreements are made at gunpoint. Our resources are classified as part of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, viewed as a matter of national security that must be guaranteed by the military. Venezuelan crude oil is increasingly used to fuel the U.S. global war machine.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that NABEP grants the U.S. State Department the right to purchase 20 percent of the production from all current and future fields operated by NABEP. The key feature: this 20 percent is guaranteed and can be purchased at cost. For the remaining 80 percent of production, the State Department has the right of first refusal to purchase it first, which, according to the U.S., guarantees an emergency source of energy within the hemisphere.
Finally, the Fact Sheet openly and explicitly states that this agreement expels its international adversaries from the hemisphere, referring directly to China – which operated some five fields included in the agreement [9] –Russia and Cuba.
So, in fact, NABEP is clearly a device for territorial and national recolonization ; as well as for geopolitical leverage.
II. Neo-colonial pact and the reshaping of Venezuela
How does such a horrific binational energy agreement slip through, violating the current Constitution, and disregarding not only decades of oil nationalism but also the 215-year history of the Republic of Venezuela? How can such an atrocity happen?
Many of the answers lie in our recent history. First, the Maduro government disastrously managed the economic crisis that had already been brewing under Chávez—who deepened the historically entrenched oil-based rentier model, which was clearly exhausted. We already know that the result has been the collapse of an entire country, exacerbated by international sanctions. Simultaneously, Maduro’s premise of clinging to power at all costs meant not only establishing a new kind of dictatorship in the country, but also dismantling democracy, institutions, regular channels of political representation, the legal economy, and political and economic alternatives, all in order to achieve this objective. All of this left the country extremely vulnerable and fragmented in light of the US military intervention of January 3, 2026.
Second, this imperialist intervention, which represents a watershed moment in Venezuela’s contemporary history, has been abolishing the country’s sovereignty —or rather, what remained of it. The Trump administration is the one calling the shots; and the Rodríguez administration acts more as a national administrator, the most ideal and compliant the US could have today, one that also guarantees territorial governance—unlike what María Corina Machado could offer.
From Washington have come orders for a sweeping reform of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, the new Mining Law, new agreements to revitalize the national electricity system, the announcement of a process of restructuring the foreign debt, post-earthquake reconstruction, and the decision on when elections and democracy will be held. Washington controls the country’s oil revenues and dictates how and when they are spent. It’s that simple.
The new oil agreement is the product of the convergence, or rather, the pact, between this ‘brutalist’ form (to use Achille Mbembe’s term [10] of imperialism promoted by Trump, based on the Donroe Doctrine, and an authoritarian and corrupt regime that has preferred to mortgage the country for decades to come in order to preserve its power and security . Thus, two styles of authoritarianism—each with its own functional mechanisms of power and wealth appropriation—are combined under a single, North American-controlled framework.
The new Oil Agreement is a product of the political decay that has been unfolding in Venezuela for years; it is the culmination of the capitulation and dismantling of oil nationalism, which began under Maduro and was finally unleashed by the US intervention. “Productive Participation Contracts” (CPPs) and the “Chevron Model” [i.e., partnerships between PDVSA and private oil companies] had already begun years earlier, during Joe Biden’s presidency in the US, granting private companies complete control—an unconstitutional practice. The integration of CPPs into the oil business structure was key to the conception and subsequent drafting of this year’s reform of the Hydrocarbons Law. Within the framework of the CPPs and this reform, NABEP or any other company can effectively carry out any operational activity in the value chain, exert de facto control over the territories, obtain recalculations of royalties and taxes, and manage its income even in bank accounts outside the country. To put it in the technical terms offered by the reformed law: address the “comprehensive management” [11] of the business.
With this background and the evidence we are witnessing, we can help to answer these questions: Who will control the oil industry and revenues? How Venezuela will benefit. A purely normative or legal interpretation of the onerous agreement is insufficient when what is unfolding is the exercise of arbitrary neocolonial power, in its purest, most unadulterated form, chained to domestic authoritarianism. Nor are analyses based on partisan political expectations enough—a sector of the population, for example, had expectations of democracy and “progress” under Trump, expectations that have clearly been deflating. Even less so those interpretations referring to superficial political promises of “growth” and “economic recovery”. Keep in mind that, if those $200 billion in royalties and taxes were to materialize over 25 years (about $8 billion annually), they could represent barely a fifth of the average annual oil tax revenues of the 2005-2009 period, without knowing how and for what they will be spent (for example, we will be forced to pay the restructured foreign debt under who-knows-what conditions), and which groups will benefit.
Questions like these must actually be contrasted with the clear evidence of how the plundering of the country is being reorganized under different structures and modalities; how an imperial/oligarchic-national pact is being consolidated that is dismantling the historic Republic to promote a reshaping of the country, where a neocolonial state is being shaped to facilitate the massive appropriation of cheap natural resources, territories, rents and surpluses, and eventually, cheap labor as well. It may be useful to review similar cases, such as that of Iraq after the 2003 invasion and the reshaping of that country’s petro-state [12] .
Because of these objectives, democracy and rights are not part of this formula. The aforementioned U.S. Fact Sheet is clear: “Increased production, output, and private sector-led investment in Venezuela is a critical prerequisite for advancing the continuation of reforms and the democratic transition following the incredible success of Operation Absolute Resolve” [13] . First, guarantee the appropriation of energy, then everything else. However, despite the rhetoric of U.S. officials on the “transition to democracy,” Trump reiterated on September 2 what he has said on numerous occasions: “Venezuela is not yet ready for elections” [14] . Democracy, the separation of powers, state independence, and adherence to the Constitution are not included here, as they are obstacles to the energy/economic objectives.
This, in essence, means that Venezuelans are locked out. They matter little. Respect for their decisions, expressed, for example, in the elections of July 28, 2024, is disregarded. Their social and labor rights are ignored. And the environment is completely invisible in this conflict. There’s no consideration of what the environmental governance of the Oil Agreement would entail; of how spills and accidents will be addressed within the context of the dying rule of law and the terrible record of US corporations worldwide. Much less is there any thought given to the fact that those 11 billion barrels of oil will be burned with such impunity, while the climate crisis worsens, and Venezuela (like the rest of Latin America) is on the verge of facing the unprecedented “Super El Niño” in just a few weeks.
In short, this mega oil agreement confirms the doubts of those who had any. It connects the geopolitical ambitions expressed in the November 2025 National Security document and the “Pax Silica” initiative with the announcement in the Fact Sheet of August 31, 2026, which states that “This deal secures our energy dominance for the next century.” The agreement is also a product of this new, extraordinarily confrontational geopolitical context surrounding strategic resources, supply chains, and spheres of influence; and is driven by highly regressive political forces that seek to dismantle democracy as a political model, while the global civilizational crisis only intensifies.
Recalling Trump’s infamous meeting with major oil companies to discuss Venezuela on January 9 of this year, the strategy to allay their concerns and guarantee long-term investments becomes clearer: to entrench and secure the mortgage of an entire country for decades to come. Only in this way could that guarantee of stable, reliable, and cheap energy eventually materialize in times of “emergencies” and geopolitical confrontation.
III. What to do? From a sovereign and popular perspective
Recognizing the enormous challenges before us, and as a contribution to a collective discussion, I will outline seven aspects to address our current situation:
1-The oil agreement has generated a very broad and diverse range of critical voices, reacting with indignation and rejection. These include economists and academics of different political leanings, former ministers from pre-Chávez governments, critics of Chavismo, some opposition groups and María Corina Machado, leftists and labor unions, social and human rights organizations, among others. It is crucial to find common ground for these voices, striving to form a national front that, through statements, campaigns, and actions, opposes this agreement in the name of respect for the Constitution. It is acknowledged that differences exist among these actors, and not all reject the agreement for the same reasons, but the gravity of the situation demands a broad, diverse, and widespread response.
2-The agreement is essentially sustained by the imperial power of the US, coupled with the authoritarian regime that still prevails in Venezuela. However, it has feet of clay due to its unconstitutional nature, the fact that decisions are being made within the framework of an illegitimate government riddled with irregularities and opacity, its being implemented by a company with directors facing serious accusations of corruption, and the considerable harm it inflicts on the country’s interests. Furthermore, several Democratic senators and some former US officials have also raised concerns about the agreement; while many of the major oil companies have expressed doubts about it and the bizarre participation of Betancourt [15] . Additionally, the question remains of what will happen to the Trump administration if an electoral debacle occurs in the midterm elections of November of this year.
3-Based on these premises, actions that highlight the illegitimacy and illegality of the agreement are crucial; these actions can serve as a basis for political and legal actions that could succeed if more favorable conditions and contexts were to develop in the country (such as the revitalization of democracy and concrete capacities for political and civic engagement). It must be said, however, that this is not something that can necessarily happen in the short term.
4- We must insist on a return to the electoral process as soon as possible. This can also contribute to creating better conditions for popular mobilization and the realization of the demands for democracy and rights held by Venezuelan society. It is crucial that the new National Electoral Council be formed through consensus and recognized by the country for the election to have meaning and validity.
5-Such demands will not be possible without the mobilization and demands of society. We recognize that the material conditions of the population are remarkably precarious and that the state maintains mechanisms of censorship. But, in contrast, there is enormous popular discontent and weariness with the predominant political-partisan actors. This translates into a great desire for change and, above all, for the recovery of minimum living conditions [16] . In addition to this, the widespread expressions of solidarity that occurred during and after the earthquakes reveal a very positive popular substance that requires support for its organization and articulation.
6- From a medium- and long-term perspective, Venezuela requires the construction of an alternative political opposition , beyond the current leadership, including María Corina Machado. Although Machado is still the leader who enjoys the greatest support and commands a significant portion of the population, her economic program does not differ from the sell-out policies of the Chavista government, nor does her political subservience to the Trump administration. Those of us who do not follow this approach recognize the urgent need to build this alternative opposition that defends historical popular demands (focuses on the most disadvantaged classes, public health and education, sovereignty over the national economy, social inclusion and participation, among others) and environmental demands, emphasizing the serious ecological problems that afflict us and the urgency of addressing the climate crisis.
7- There is also a dispute over culture and common sense that must be addressed. This implies re-strengthening the ideals of democracy, which have been severely undermined by the Maduro regime and by U.S. intervention. It means proposing alternative perspectives on the reconstruction of Venezuela, ones that highlight the importance of the economy, but also emphasize that our country is much more than oil, GDP growth, and macroeconomic indicators. Venezuela is also its local and regional economies—which have helped sustain a large part of the country when the national economy collapsed—its territories and ecosystems, which provide life to society; its social fabric, its communities, and its diverse cultural identities, which nourish not only collective memory but also Venezuelan identity; and ultimately, the popular dignity that has marked national history, full of struggles for justice and freedom. This can also foster other visions of sovereignty, beyond thinking of it solely from the perspective of the state’s centrality, to understand it in the same way as the will, participation, action, and autonomy of the population. “Reclaiming Venezuela” must be framed within a horizon where expanding the well-being and sustenance of life for the vast majority are the central elements.
References:
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/117175567133618952
[2] It should be noted that this figure is calculated based on a recovery factor of 20%, which, at least in Venezuela, has not actually been achieved, so this level of reserves is, at the very least, subject to controversy. Another issue to discuss is whether all of these reserves can be exploited.
[4] The fields include: Lagunillas Lago, Lagocinco, Sinovenezolana, Lagomar, Tía Juana Lago, Rosa Mediano, Lagomedio, Petrozamora, Petrocedeño, Junín Sur, Boyacá 8 and 5, Junín 1, 3 and 11, and Ayacucho 6 and 7. More info: https://www.bloomberglinea.com/latinoamerica/venezuela/acuerdo-entre-eeuu-y-venezuela-desplaza-a-operadores-sancionados-por-washington-de-17-yacimientos/
[6] See case documentation at: https://armando.info/este-sargento-de-florida-es-el-plan-b-de-maduro-con-bolichico-incluido/ ; and https://transparenciave.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/El-bolichico-Alejandro-Betancourt-Lopez-pagara-cuentas-a-la-justicia.pdf
[10] Mbembe, a Cameroonian historian, published his book “Brutalism” in 2020, where he analyzes the new trends of a global system that unleashes uninhibited and limitless violence, that counts and digitizes the fabric of life, and transforms humanity into matter and energy. https://www.planetadelibros.com.ec/libro-brutalismo/347266
[11] See my previous article: Integrated Analysis of the Reform to the Hydrocarbons Law in Venezuela: Trends, Meanings, and Implications. https://ecopoliticavenezuela.org/analisis-integrado-de-la-reforma-a-la-ley-de-hidrocarburos-en-venezuela-tendencias-significados-e-implicaciones/
[12] See: Muttitt, Greg (2011) Fuel on the fire: oil and politics in occupied Iraq . London: Bodley Head. Also: Le Billon, Philippe (2015) ‘The Contested Politics of Iraq’s Oil Wealth’, in Isakhan B. The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the ‘Islamic State’ . Edinburgh University Press.
[13] Original: “Private-sector led growth in production, output, and investment in Venezuela is a key precondition to driving continued reform and democratic transition following the incredible success of Operation Absolute Resolve.”
[16] See the results of the latest Datincorp survey: https://diarioversionfinal.com/politica-dinero/datincorp-81-de-los-venezolanos-no-se-siente-representado-por-ningun-liderazgo-politico/
