- The cry on Paulista Avenue [downtown São Paulo] on the day of the Cry of Ipiranga was victory or death. In announcing his strategy, Bolsonaro made it clear that he will not give up the all-out fight for power, whatever the cost. He gathered forces. The two immediate tactical objectives of the counter-revolutionary mobilization were to warn the liberal opposition that he will set the country on fire if they go for impeachment, and to polarize positions against the STF (Supreme Federal Court) ministers Alexandre de Moraes and Barroso who are closing in on Bolsonaro’s family with investigations and prison. But Bolsonaro’s threat is even more serious. He is making it clear for the fraction of the ruling class that has gone over to the opposition in the last forty days that he will not accept the result of the elections if he loses. He will not respect the rules of the liberal-democratic regime; there will be no peaceful transmission of the presidential sash in Brasilia in January 2023. The head of the neo-fascists seeks to reposition himself for the 2022 elections but promises that he is ready for anything. So, he riles up his social base for the possibility of an institutional rupture if necessary. In other words, all or nothing, and the threat of civil war.
- The counter-offensive has taken place in the framework of an uninterrupted weakening, since May, with the peak of the second wave of the pandemic. But it has shown that it has not been entirely defeated. The biggest mistake of the left in the last three years was to underestimate Bolsonarism. Lula’s lead in the polls, at this moment, is no guarantee of anything. Considering only the degrees of approval and rejection revealed by the polls is insufficient to gauge the relationship of social and political forces. Before hundreds of thousands of fanatical followers, Bolsonaro has become stronger. All is not lost. Bolsonaro does not yet have an electoral victory, but he demonstrated that he controls a “combat party”, that is, the organization of a neo-fascist counterrevolutionary movement with a political strategy, social power, self-sustaining financial resources, initiative in the streets and social networks, international relations, strong military and police influence, and a leadership with messianic authority.
- For the moment, Bolsonaro’s tacticis to buy time. He bites and he soothes. He occupies city centers but does not authorize riots. He encourages road blockades by truckers, but then orders them to leave. He makes threats of a coup but issues a letter of appeasement. Neither the pressure for military tutelage, nor Sergio Moro or Paulo Guedes, nor the agreement with Centrão [clientelist and opportunistic parties that exchange positions and favors for parliamentary support to the government], much less Michel Temer, a lifeless political corpse, will be able to stop Bolsonaro. But is his strategic aim to guarantee a better repositioning for the electoral contest and ensure reelection? Yes, but that is not all. The far-right government led by a neo-fascist is not a “normal” government with an agenda of neoliberal counter-reforms. Bolsonaro’s strategy is a new localization of Brazilian capitalism in the world in a strategic alliance with a fraction of U.S. imperialism against China. The recolonization plan is based on the expectation that foreign investments are the key to resuming economic growth. But to do this it is necessary to impose a historic defeat on the working class and the poor and oppressed. A qualitative change in the social relations of forces is only possible using the subversive powers of a regime that can guarantee the maximum concentration of power. The project is insurrectionist, Bonapartist, counterrevolutionary. The forms, the times, the designs of the insurrectional initiatives may be tactical questions, nevertheless, they are inevitable.
- The policy of the liberal opposition has changed with the recent support for impeachment, at least as individuals, by Doria [José Doria, governor of Sao Paulo for the PSDB] and Kassab [Gilberto Kassab, federal deputy of the PSD]. The ruling class is divided. Bolsonaro is increasingly dysfunctional and disruptive. The bourgeois fraction that has displaced the opposition is very powerful and has tried to exert institutional pressure. But it is hesitant to move toward impeachment. The liberal right is much more concerned with the position of the Armed Forces than withCentrão. And there is immense uncertainty about the role of Mourão [Antonio Hamilton Mourão, retired general and vice-president of the Republic]. In any case, in the face of the new conjuncture, a change of tactics is necessary on the left. The tactic of unity in action has become more important because a sector of the liberal opposition has finally shifted toward support for impeachment. It will be challenging but necessary to fight hard for a united front in favor of Bolsonaro Out. We must prepare our initiative respecting the spaces built by United Left Front while insuring the political independence necessary for the defense of workers’ demands.
- The decision of the Popular Brasil Front, Pueblo sin Miedo, and the Black Coalition for Rights to maintain the National Day of Struggle on September 7, was correct. They were not large, but they were dignified. Moreover, they received the embrace of a national outcry on the same night. It was correct because the danger of division and, potentially, the demoralization of the activists of all the movements and parties was real. It is necessary to remain resolute and maintain our capacity for tactical and strategic calculation. Five years of accumulated defeats have left wounds. There is instability in our ranks. We should be perplexed by the “bipolar” oscillations in the analysis of the situation, going from demoralization to euphoria in a matter of days, even among analysts on the left. It makes no sense that for a week an apocalyptic vision of “real and immediate danger” of a self-coup has prevailed and, a posteriori, the conclusion that Bolsonarismhas “failed”. We are in a hurry, so we must move responsibly. We will return to the streets, and we will be a majority, but it is necessary to build larger mobilizations than in May, June, and July. It will not be easy, but it is possible to grow stronger. The impact of the Bolsonarist demonstrations should not divide the left. We have already seen that the pulverization of positions on September 7 was a disaster, and that ill-advised proclamations were harmful. A change of tactics must not divide the left. Fragmentation is a real danger. The United Front was the biggest step forward in 2021. The central issue is that the ability of the left to put in place its social base of implantation has proved, for the moment, insufficient to pave the way for impeachment. The health, economic, social, and political tragedy that angers us was not enough. Six hundred thousand deaths, unemployment of more than 14 million homeless, 20 million in food insecurity, inflation at 10%, the danger of an electric blackout, the fires in the Pantanal and the Amazon, the invasion of indigenous lands, the 30% reduction of enrollment in the Enem (National High School Examination), were not enough. The central strategic dilemma for of the left is that the passive tactic of waiting for the 2022 elections is morally, politically, and strategically wrong. Bolsonaro is not the ideal enemy in 2022.
It is time to fight for impeachment and move forward. The challenge is to turn the opposing social majority into a social shock force to overthrow Bolsonaro.
Courtesy Correspondenciade Prensa & Esquerda Online